USCGC Polar Sea

The following is copied directly from the CG-9 web site.

“The Coast Guard issued a request for quote (RFQ) on Dec. 22 for industry studies to identify solutions for the heavy polar icebreaker that minimize cost, schedule, production and technology risk. The request can be found here.

“The Coast Guard expects to award multiple industry study contracts early next year. This will be followed by a request for proposal for detail design and construction of heavy polar icebreakers in 2018.

“The deadline to submit responses to the industry studies RFQ is Jan. 20, 2017.

“This request is part of a larger industry engagement strategy supporting the Coast Guard’s effort to expedite the recapitalization of the heavy polar icebreaker fleet. In addition to the industry studies request, the Coast Guard has sponsored industry day events to promote communication on mission and design requirements and solicited input from industry on acquisition approach and schedule.

US Capital West Side, by Martin Falbisoner

The influencial Conservative think tank, Heritage Foundation, has issued a report on the Department of Homeland Security that will likely strongly influence the incoming administration and Congress.

It does not call for any radical increase in the Coast Guard budget for FY2017 ($10.85B). In fact it calls of less funding than was enacted in 2016 ($11.112B), but more than the current administration has requested ($10.322B).

It does support the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) and Polar Icebreaker (PIB) programs and continued procurement of six Webber class (FRC) rather than the four currently requested.

For the future, it appears they support a more stable AC&I budget of at least $1.5B. To me it appears likely the AC&I budget will go higher as both the OPC and PIB enter the construction phase, and they spoke against imposition of a defacto ceiling.

The most significant new direction, seemed to be strong support for Unmanned Air Systems.

Unmanned Aerial Systems. The Coast Guard would also benefit greatly from procuring UASs to support NSC operations. According to the GAO, “Coast Guard officials acknowledged that the lack of [cutter-based] unmanned aircraft would create a gap between the NSC’s actual and planned capabilities.” Dr. William Posage, program manager for the Coast Guard Research and Development Center, explained that the lack of cutter-based UAS technologies “left the NSC with an enormous surveillance gap in her ability to perform her mission.” Notably, the operational effectiveness of the NSC without a UAS component would “be comparable to that of the 378-foot Hamilton class high-endurance cutter,” the very program it was designed to replace with capability enhancements.

The Coast Guard has successfully tested the FireScout and ScanEagle UAS platforms, both of which would significantly amplify the NSC’s surveillance, detection, classification, and prosecution capabilities. Widely used for similar naval operations, they have successfully contributed to a handful of at-sea Coast Guard demonstrations. According to an assessment by the Coast Guard Office of Aviation Forces, the presence of two vertical take-off FireScout UASs aboard an NSC would enable the cutter to cover three times the presence radius of an NSC without them. Similarly, according to a Senate Appropriations Committee report, “[t]he Coast Guard has reported…that its long standing plan to add vertical take-off unmanned aircraft systems to the National Security Cutters would result in an estimated 95- to 225-percent increase in surveillance coverage within an 800 nautical mile radius of the cutter and an estimated 95-percent increase in the number of prosecutions achieved by the cutter.”

The Coast Guard’s FY 2017 budget justification states that funding for the NSC program will in part “establish sUAS [small UAS] capability aboard one NSC, to include engineering analysis, non-recurring engineering, procurement and installation of sUAS components, and system testing and certification.” Admiral Zukunft testified before the House Transportation Committee in March 2016 that this activity would involve a “down select” for a sUAS capability “that will go on board” the NSC. The NSC will amplify its aerial ISR capabilities dramatically with the longer-term integration of sUAS, while the sea service should continue to evaluate the vertical unmanned aerial vehicle (VUAV) platform.

This seems to indicate a two pronged approach, first a small UAS (Scan Eagle or something similar) in the near future and a continued interest in evaluating a vertical takeoff unmanned system like Firescout or potentially DARPA’s TERN.

All the UAS discussion centers on the National Security Cutters. There is no discussion of the possibility of using UAS on any other classes.

OPC “Placemat”

MarineLink has a story on the OPC, and it includes a bit more detail, and it raises some questions. I’ve also seen a couple of stories about how they will be equipped that will be referred to below.

There is this:

“Zukunft’s budget suggests at least one cutter, or an immediate separate order, will be arctic capable, and Vard and Canadian engineering consultancy BMT Fleet are already understood to be working on project documents for a Canadian “arctic offshore patrol ship” of Vard 7 100 type.”

VARD 7-100 ICE, the Canadian AOPS

Vard actually has two designs designated “7-100,” an offshore patrol vessel (pdf) very similar to the OPC and the 7-100 ICE. Apparently, it is the 7-100 ICE they are referring to here. The VARD 7-100 ICE (pdf) is also known as the Canadian Navy’s Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS). Does that mean the Coast Guard is looking at the Canadian AOPS as a possible Arctic Patrol Vessel, perhaps filling the role of one or two of the three medium icebreaker? They do have power similar to the old Wind class icebreakers.

We also have this indication the standard OPCs are still expected to patrol the Arctic. (Var refers to the OPC as the Vard 7 110.)

“…the Vard 7 110’s will also patrol the “increasingly accessible Arctic”, a theatre which might require a more closed superstructure, more akin to the Vard 7 100.”

The Vard 7 100 ICE has its ground tackle below the foc’sle deck to protect it from freezing. Perhaps that is what this means. This has also been done on some European Frigates.

Then there is this little bit of speculation about who will build follow on ships”

“Owned by the Italian state via Fintecna, Fincantieri doubled after its acquisition of Vard to become the fourth largest shipbuilder in the world and the largest in the Med. As we wrote these words, Financtieri’s Trieste-based minds were making a friendly offer for the 44 percent of Vard they don’t own. It’s worth noting that in January 2009, Fincantieri bought Manitowoc Marine Group and its two yards in Wisconsin, including the Marinette Marine that built the first Freedom Class littoral combat ship. So, Eastern, it seems, has a rival and a friend in Fincantieri, another maker of mid-sized vessels for the U.S. Navy. So, who knows what may be next from U.S. military-industrial strategists keen to share financial resources with capable NATO allies while also creating jobs at home. For now, all eyes will be on those remaining OPVs.

They are pointing out that there may be competition for the follow on contract. That is good for the Coast Guard.

I would also point out that it also means Marinette might make modified OPCs for the Navy, if the Navy ever realizes that the LCS is not going to make a very good “small surface combatant.”

Northrop Grumman Corporation reports they have been awarded a contract for the design of the C4ISR and machinery control systems (MCS).

“The systems being supplied include integrated bridge systems, command and control consoles, navigation and combat data distribution systems, ship-wide computer network systems, machinery control systems and propulsion control systems

“Included in the design phase of the OPC program is a MCS land-based test facility, as well as a C4ISR test and integration facility, both of which will be located in Charlottesville. Additional work will be conducted at company facilities in San Diego, and Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Northrop Grumman will also provide key C4ISR and MCS integration roles during production testing and shipboard trials to be held in Panama City, Florida.”

MarineLog identified the engines to be used.

Each 360 foot-long vessel will be powered by two FM-MAN 16V 28/33D diesel engines, each rated at 9,763 bhp at 1,000 rpm.

We have consistently seen the speed quoted as 22.5 knots sustained or 22 or more. I suspect they are being conservative. With almost 20,000 HP, the ship ought to make 24 or even 25 knots, in all but the most adverse conditions of load and bottom fouling.

I would have preferred the 20,000 KW (26820 HP) engines advertised for the VARD 7 1000 which would have assured 25 knots, but it’s not bad. If the 7 110 follows the pattern of the 7 100 OPV, than there will be hybrid propulsion, with electric motors on the shaft in addition to geared diesel drive from the main engines. For a cruising speed of 14 knots, that would require two electric motors of about 1,500 HP each.

 “In order to provide fuel efficiency and greater range, this vessel is powered by CODELAD (combined diesel and electric) which allows for instantaneous changeover.”

This would make a lot of sense, in that in addition to the fuel economy benefits it would improve the ships survivability. It could lose both main diesel engines and still have propulsion.

OPC “Placemat”

We have confirmation that the Offshore Patrol Cutter will have a hybrid propulsion system.

Shephard Media is reporting that, “DRS Technologies, a Leonardo Company, has been selected to provide the hybrid-electric drive propulsion system for the US Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Cutter.”

As to the exact configuration, we have this. Clive Wilgress-Pipe, director of business development and strategic programs at DRS Power Technology said,

“…that the new Offshore Patrol Cutter design solution uses the gearbox mount configuration.”

This suggests to me that the electric propulsion motors (EPM) will be physically close to the main diesel engines (MDE). Assuming the ship will retain redundant machinery spaces, I will speculate and say, this probably means the ship will have two machinery spaces each with a complete propulsion set (MDE, clutch, gearbox, and EPM) for one shaft, plus one or two generators. Previously I had expected one engine room with both main diesel engines, and a motor room with both electric motors.

We don’t have a speed capability for the ship on electric propulsion alone. I had assumed it would provide at least 14 knots to give the long endurance (10,400 n.mi.) claimed for that speed, which might have required only a pair of 1,500 HP motors, but Mr. Wilgress-Pipe’s remarks suggest it might be more.

“Typically you rate it up to about 17 or 18 knots.”

That would require something more like a total of 6,000 HP. As noted, in the linked post, some configurations (COmbined Diesel Electric And Diesel, CODLAD) allow the power of the electric motors to suppliment the main propulsion engines. If that is the case, and we could add something like 6,000 HP to the two 16V 28/33D diesel engines, each rated at 9,763 bhp, then the ship would almost certainly have a 25 knot max speed. (This is of course speculation, so we can only be sure of the 22.5 knots sustained previously reported.)

Giving these ships the option of cruising on electric power, provided only by the ship’s service generators, makes these ship potentially more useful as ASW ships. In this mode, they will be quieter and, in noisy littoral environments, more difficult for a submarine to distinguish from other traffic.

Thanks to Luke for bringing this to my attention. 

UAE offshore patrol vessel Arialah (note the concept above is incorrect in that the gun is a BAE 57mm rather than the 76mm illustrated).

DefenseNews reports first impressions of a new Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) built for UAE’s Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Agency (CICPA) shown at the NAVDEX (naval) portion of the IDEX international Defense Exposition in Abu Dhabi.

The ships are 67 meters (220 feet) in length, 11 meters (36 feet) of beam, and 5.4 meters (18 feet) of draft, with a speed of 20+ knots provided by four MTU engines driving four propellers.

Most of the armament is typical OPV, a 57 mm gun and two 30mm auto-cannon in remote weapon stations. What really sets it apart, is the Mk49 Rolling Airframe Missile launcher.

On the other hand, the UAE is just across the Straits of Hormuz from Iran and their shore based anti-ship cruise missiles.

Photo: Mk49 guided missile launch system for Rolling Airframe Missile

An earlier post provides a bit more detail on the program but it appears to have a couple of errors regarding the weapon systems (indicates a 76mm as seen in the first illustration vice 57mm and says the Mk49 launcher has 11 cells rather than the actual 21). There are to be two of this class, both to be delivered this year.

“The ships themselves will be delivered from Damen’s Galati shipyard in Romania in 2017; they will then go to ADSB’s facility in Abu Dhabi’s Mussafah industrial area for combat systems installation and integration prior to delivery to the CICPA.”

This looks like a straight forward adaptation of one of Damen’s designs for Offshore Industry Support Vessels with boats, helo deck, ESM/ECM, weapons and sensors added.

According to this older source, the Coast Guard was involved in the development of the SEA AXE Bow.

“Damen … has developed the sea axe bow design in partnership with the University of Delft, Royal Netherlands Navy, US Coast Guard and the Maritime Research Institute Netherlands.”

Damen 85 meter Offshore Patrol Vessel, 1800

Naval today reports, 

On February 15, Armscor (the acquisition agency for the South African Department of Defence–Chuck) announced Damen Shipyards Cape Town as the preferred bidder for the construction of offshore and inshore patrol boats…”

Reportedly the project includes three Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and three Inshore Patrol Boats (IPBs) for the South African Navy.

The OPVs will be Damen’s Offshore Patrol Vessel 1800 Sea Axe, illustrated above, 85 meters in length, with a beam of 13.7 meters, and a speed of 26 knots.

The IPBs will be Damen’s FCS (STAN PATROL) 5009 design, illustrated below, which is also used by the Ecuadorian and Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guards. These are 50.2 meters (165 ft) in length, 9.32 meters (30.6 ft) of beam. The South African vessels are expected to make 30 knots. An unusual feature (aside from the bow) is the use of four propellers.

I talked to someone who has ridden on a 5009 patrol vessel and he reported that it did indeed significantly reduce pitching. The tradeoff was that it was very wet forward. This should not be surprising since the design minimizes the rise of the bow when it encounters a wave.  You can see that they have attempted to counter this tendency by making the bow high and providing high bulwarks.

On the second page of this description of the design you will see a diagram of the ship which indicates that it can be fitted with up to three boats and a twin 40mm mount.

An earlier post reported a plea by Representative Duncan Hunter, Chair of the Transportation Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, for the Coast Guard to provide an unfunded priority list to include six icebreakers and unmanned Air System.

Thought perhaps I would list my own “unfunded priorities.” These are not in any particular order.

PLATFORM SHORTFALLS

Icebreakers: We have a documented requirement for three heavy and three medium icebreakers, certainly they should be on the list. Additionally they should be designed with the ability to be upgraded to wartime role. Specifically they should have provision for adding defensive systems similar to those on the LPD–a pair of SeaRAM and a pair of gun systems, either Mk46 mounts or Mk38 mod 2/3s. We might want the guns permanently installed on at least on the medium icebreakers for the law enforcement mission. Additionally they should have provision for supporting containerized mission modules like those developed for the LCS and lab/storage space identified that might be converted to magazine space to support armed helicopters.

110225-N-RC734-011
PACIFIC OCEAN (Feb. 25, 2011) Guy Mcallister, from Insitu Group, performs maintenance on the Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Comstock (LSD 45). Scan Eagle is a runway independent, long-endurance, UAV system designed to provide multiple surveillance, reconnaissance data, and battlefield damage assessment missions. Comstock is part of the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group, which is underway in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility during a western Pacific deployment. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joseph M. Buliavac/Released)

Unmanned Air Systems (UAS): We seem to be making progress on deploying UAS for the Bertholf class NSCs which will logically be extended to the Offshore Patrol Cutters. So far we see very little progress on land based UAS. This may be because use of the Navy’s BAMS system is anticipated. At any rate, we will need a land based UAS or access to the information from one to provide Maritime Domain Awareness. We also need to start looking at putting UAS on the Webber class. They should be capable of handling ScanEagle sized UAS.

Photo: The Coast Guard Cutter Bluebell sits moored along the Willamette River waterfront in Portland, Ore., June 4, 2015. The Bluebell, which celebrated its 70th anniversary this year, is one of many ships participating in the 100th year of the Portland Rose Festival. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer David Mosley.)

Recapitalize the Inland Tender Fleet: This is long overdue. The program was supposed to begin in 2009, but so far, no tangible results. It seems to have been hanging fire for way too long.

Expand the Program of Record to the FMA-1 level: The Fleet Mix Study identified additional assets required to meet the Coast Guard’s statutory obligations identifying four asset levels above those planned in the program of record. Lets move at least to first increment.

Alternative Fleet Mix Asset Quantities

————–POR       FMA-1      FMA-2      FMA-3       FMA-4
NSC                8             9                 9                 9                  9
OPC              25           32               43                50               57
FRC              58           63               75                80               91
HC-130         22            32               35                44               44
HC-144A       36            37               38                40               65
H-60              42            80               86                99             106
H-65             102         140             159              188            223
UAS-LB           4            19                21                21              22
UAS-CB        42            15                19               19               19

At the very least, looks like we need to add some medium range search aircraft (C-27J or HC-144).

Increase Endurance of Webber Class Cutters: The Webber class could be more useful if the endurance were extended beyond five days (currently the same as the 87 cutters, which have only one-third the range). We needed to look into changes that would allow an endurance of ten days to two weeks. They already have the fuel for it.

MISSION EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS

Ship Stopper (Light Weight Homing Torpedo): Develop a system to forcibly stop even the largest merchant ships by disabling their propulsion, that can be mounted on our patrol boats. A torpedo seems the most likely solution. Without such a system, there is a huge hole in our Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission.

Photo: SeaGriffin Launcher

Counter to Small High Speed Craft (Small Guided Weapon): Identify and fit weapons to WPB and larger vessels that are capable of reliably stopping or destroying small fast boats that may be used as fast inshore attack craft and suicide or remote-controlled unmanned explosive motor boats. These weapons must also limit the possibility of collateral damage. Small missiles like SeaGriffin or Hellfire appear likely solutions.

40 mm case telescoped gun (bottom) compared to conventional guns.

Improved Gun–Penetration, Range, and Accuracy: The .50 cal. and 25mm guns we have on our WPBs and WPCs have serious limitations in their ability to reach their targets from outside the range of weapons terrorist adversaries might improvise for use against the cutters. They have limited ability to reach the vitals of medium to large merchant vessels, and their accuracy increases the possibility of collateral damage and decreases their probability of success. 30, 35, and 40 mm replacements for the 25 mm in our Mk38 mod2 mounts are readily available.

Laser Designator: Provide each station, WPB, and WPC with a hand-held laser designator to allow them to designate targets for our DOD partners.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING SHORTFALLS

Vessel Wartime Upgrades: Develop plans for a range of options to upgrade Coast Guard assets for an extended conflict against a near peer.

When I first read this report from MarineLink, what I concentrated on was the generator capacity to be included in the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), four 1,000 KW generators. Second time around I noticed reference to “Promas rudders,” and was curious enough to look it up and found it very interesting.

Here is a short pdf from Rolls-Royce explaining the claimed advantages of this system in terms of increased maneuverability, speed, and fuel economy.

They also claim decreased noise. Anything that improves the hydrodynamic efficiency of a ship probably also cuts down on its self noise, so it and the hybrid propulsion probably make the ship potentially a better ASW platform.

To Recap:

The two main diesel engines will be 16V 28/33D diesel engines, each rated at 9,763 bhp

There will have a hybrid propulsion system provided by DRS Power Technology with a pair of electric motors connected to the reduction gears. I assume these will be good for at least the ships’ designated cruise speed of 14 knots.

Since we know that DRS makes a 1500kW (about 2,000 HP) that is made to be connected to the reduction gear, so that seems a likely candidate for the motors to be used on the OPC. A pair would provide about 4,000 HP which should provide at least 14 knots.

Stars and Stripes reports,

“President Donald Trump’s budget would eliminate a $600 million-plus state-of-the-art Coast Guard cutter that’s a priority of the powerful Republican chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

“The proposal by Office of Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney is included in draft documents of the White House budget request. The documents, obtained by The Associated Press, ask the Department of Homeland Security to cancel its contract with Ingalls Shipbuilding, which is to construct the national security cutter at its shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi.”

This is of course the ninth Bertholf National Security Cutter. When funded, there was a loud outcry that the Coast Guard did not ask for it, which, because the Coast Guard leadership “supported the administration budget,” and failed to provide a list of unfunded priorities, was true, but the implication that we did not need it was not.

The unfunded priorities list has long been a sore point with me, here, here, here, and here. The Navy does one of these every year. The Congress asked for one from the Coast Guard every year. We can’t seem to get off our ass and provide one, or is it that the leadership is so cowed by the department that they are afraid to say what is needed?

The “Fleet Mix Study” showed the Coast Guard needed a ninth NSC to meet its statutory obligations and with its fleet rapidly aging and the Offshore Patrol Cutter program long-delayed, the Coast Guard is desperately in need of new ships. Terminating this ship at this stage would be very disappointing and a poor decision. But perhaps we have only ourselves to blame.

–

Former Commandant, Admiral Papp, has been at the Sea-Air-Space EXPO representing Eastern Shipbuilding. He has given a couple of interviews, the one above and a second one here.

Of the two, I think the one you can view above is by far the more interesting, and his comments were not limited to the Offshore Patrol Cutter, discussing the inland tender fleet and the CG budget in general as well. There were a couple of notable details in the interview.

Admiral Papp stated explicitly that the expected crew size for the OPC would be 126 (I suspect this might actually refer to the planned accommodations rather than the crew). That is considerably more than the crew of the WMECs they replace. These ships are actually a third again larger than the 378s and much more capable than the ships they replace, so this should not be a great surprise. I do think this is more than the nominal crew of the National Security Cutter, although probably less than they actually sail with.

He also stated that the electric motors in the hybrid propulsion system would be good for at least nine and perhaps as much as 13 knots. All along I had assumed the hybrid system had been adopted as a means of meeting the range requirement, but since it is apparent they do not expect to be able to reach 14 knots using the electric motors, then the claimed range of 10,200 miles at 14 knots must be achievable using the Main Propulsion diesels. This suggest the range at lower speeds using only the ship’s service generators and electric motors may actually be considerably more.

Admiral Papp also suggested that there may be a possibility of exporting Eastern built ships because of its projected cost, well under $350M per ship.

Thanks to Luke for bringing this to my attention. 

Photo: VARD designed icebreaking supply vessel for Chile. 

MarineLog is reporting, “APRIL 6, 2017—Philly Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA, is teaming with Fincantieri Marine Group (FMG) to compete for the detail design and construction of the next generation heavy polar icebreaker for the United States Coast Guard (USCG).”

“Over the next year, FMG and Philly Shipyard, along with the naval architecture and marine engineering firm, Vard, will develop a baseline icebreaker design, cost estimate and project schedule and then refine them based on the results of the technical studies and corresponding feedback from the USCG.”

This is in response to a contracted awarded to five shipbuilders on Feb. 22, 2017, for preliminary design studies and analysis. Contracts were awarded to Bollinger Shipyards, LLC, Lockport, LA; Fincantieri Marine Group, LLC, Washington, DC; General Dynamics/National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, San Diego, CA; Huntington Ingalls, Inc., Pascagoula, MS; and VT Halter Marine, Inc., Pascagoula, MS, totalling approximately $20M.

Fincantieri is building a 9000 ton research icebreaker for Norway and Vard has designed an icebreaking supply vessel for Chile.

We have a news release on the electric portion of the Offshore Patrol Cutter’s hybrid propulsion system. There is not a lot of specifics about the system, but it does provide a rationale for installation of this additional system in a ship that above all else is designed to be “affordable.” The news release is quoted in full below.

ARLINGTON, VA, April 13, 2017 ̶Leonardo DRS, Inc. announced today that it has been awarded a contract by Eastern Shipbuilding to provide hybrid electric drive systems for the U.S. Coast Guard’s new fleet of Offshore Patrol Cutters. The contract, for the first nine systems, is worth $10.7 million. Eastern Shipbuilding is the prime contractor and builder of these nextgeneration Offshore Patrol Cutters.

Under the contract, Leonardo DRS will provide its high-performance, permanent magnet motorbased Auxiliary Propulsion System. This integrated hybrid electric drive system provides capability for the ship to operate much more efficiently at slower speeds, increases mission duration capability, reduces emissions and provides emergency take-home capability in the event of a failure of the main propulsion diesel engines. When coupled to the main propulsion gearbox, the system allows the ship to operate quietly and efficiently during loitering operations while providing superior fuel economy for increased on-station operations and capability.

“DRS is a pioneer in naval hybrid electric drive technologies and we are proud to be able to deliver these advanced systems to the Coast Guard’s newest generation of ships,” said Dianne Howells, Vice President of Leonardo DRS Surface Ships business unit. “Our Auxiliary Propulsion Systems will give the crews of these new ships operational flexibility when they need it, while significantly increasing cost savings in yearly maintenance and fuel.”

The Auxiliary Propulsion System is designed and built by Leonardo DRS, a leader in naval hybrid electric drive propulsion technology. The system includes two of the most power-dense permanent magnet motors on the market today. They have significant advantages in size, weight, efficiency and performance over conventional electric induction motors and produce more torque from the same amount of supplied current. Their smaller footprint allows greater flexibility in engine room design and increased cargo space, and their simpler more rugged construction results in proven reliability and durability.

Using propulsion diesel engines at slow speeds adds significant wear and tear on the engines and increases the potential for coking/wet stacking. By adding this electric Auxiliary Propulsion System, the Coast Guard will have a built-in advantage of reducing not only fuel and maintenance requirements, but total lifecycle costs and increased safety for the fleet.

About Leonardo DRS Leonardo DRS is a prime contractor, leading technology innovator and supplier of integrated products, services and support to military forces, intelligence agencies and prime contractors worldwide. The company specializes in naval and maritime systems, ground combat mission command and network computing, global satellite communications and network infrastructure, avionics systems, and intelligence and security solutions. Additionally, DRS builds power systems and electro-optical/infrared systems for a wide range of commercial customers. Headquartered in Arlington, Virginia, DRS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Leonardo S.p.A., which employs more than 47,000 people worldwide. See the full range of capabilities at http://www.drs.com and on Twitter @drstechnologies. For additional information please contact: Michael Mount Senior Director, Public Affairs 571-447-4624 mmount@drs.com Twitter: @drstechnologies

The Coast Guard leadership has been hitting the Coast Guard’s National Security role pretty hard since the change of administration and the “skinny budget” scare.

Here is the Commandant’s latest pitch to “a roundtable of the Defense Writers Group, a nonprofit association of defense reporters.”

Like other service chiefs he is messaging that a continuing resolution would be a disaster.

“The good news is we are modernizing the fleet, but it’s that annual operating and maintenance account that you have to get very creative,” Zukunft said. “Where we’re seeing the most pain is we defer a lot of our shore maintenance; that backlog continues to grow.”

Zukunft said his greatest concern right now is to have budget certainty and not temporary funding measures; the current continuing resolution that funds the government runs through April 28.

“Maybe we’ll see a short extension of that, but if we don’t have an appropriation in 2017, I will have to shut down operations,” he said, adding that will affect readiness. “This is not the time to sideline any military service, including the Coast Guard, but that’s what a [continuing resolution] would do.”

To say we are in good shape in terms of modernization is at least optimistic, but perhaps the Commandant has some favorable indications from Congress. They do like things that add jobs. Still even if we start getting icebreakers the OPC is long overdue and I suspect that we may see the WMECs start failing at an ever increasing rate since we don’t expect full replacement of the fleet until about 2034. Building two a year is going to take too long.

Vigor’s Seattle facility

Got a news release from Vigor which is quoted below:

SEATTLE, WASH. (April 17, 2017) Building on its ongoing investments in critical infrastructure and fulfilling a promise to customers to expand West Coast drydock capacity, Vigor has entered into an agreement to purchase a drydock from a Korean seller. At 640 feet long with a clear width of 116 feet, the new dock will be the third, and largest, at Vigor’s Harbor Island shipyard.

“The purchase of another drydock in Seattle allows Vigor to better service valued customers like Washington State Ferries, the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy,” notes Adam Beck, Vigor Executive Vice President of Ship Repair. “It also further strengthens our market position in commercial ship repair on the West Coast and supports our expansion into new markets.”

Beck and his team had been actively looking for the right drydock at home and abroad for a number of months. The one selected happened to be in Korea. The team is working to finalize the transaction and have the dock operational in Seattle by late Fall. Customer feedback to the news has been overwhelmingly positive.

“Washington State Ferries is greatly relieved and appreciative to hear of Vigor’s important investment in a new drydock for its Harbor Island/Seattle location. We have been concerned about the shortage of drydock availability for the maintenance and repair of our fleet,” said Matt Von Ruden, Director of Vessel Engineering and Maintenance, Washington State Ferries. “Regular maintenance is critical to our ability to achieve the expected service life of our vessels and keep them operating well for our customers.”

DRYDOCK PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS:

Length: 640 FT, Clear Width: 116 FT, Lift Capacity: 20,000 LT

Vigor was not one of the five contractors awarded icebreaker design contracts, but this drydock could handle a very large icebreaker and Seattle is perhaps the most logical place to base them. In any case it will add to the maintenance capability in the Pacific NW.

OPC “Placemat”

Criticism of the Littoral Combat Ship Program continues unabated, with additional fuel thrown on the fire by a series of machinery casualties. With the new administration indicating they will take a look at existing programs, looking for savings, at the same time they are seeking a much larger fleet, it seems likely the LCS program will get a second look. After initially choosing to base the new frigate, on one of the LCS designs, it now appears the Navy is willing to look at other hulls.

Perhaps the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) might be considered.

• It is larger than either of the two LCS designs.
• It cost less.
• It is built to ABS Naval Vessel Rules
• It is likely that anything that can be added to the LCS can be added to the OPC.
• It has two to three times the range and endurance.
• It can operate in heavier seas.
• It has 25% more generator capacity than the Freedom class LCS (unable to find info on the Independence class.)
• It’s more spacious interior makes it easier to maintain.
• It’s engineering plant is simpler and probably more reliable.
• It’s efficient hybrid diesel/electric propulsion system permits much long loiter times.
• It’s propulsion system is probably inherently quieter than the water jets used on the LCSs–an advantage for ASW.
• It’s only real disadvantage is lower speed and that can be mitigated if necessary.

The GAO has recommended a two year hiatus.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP AND FRIGATE
Slowing Planned Frigate Acquisition Would Enable
Better-Informed Decisions

What GAO Found
The Navy’s vision for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has evolved significantly over the last 15 years, reflecting degradations of the underlying business case. Initial plans to experiment with two different prototype ships adapted from commercial designs were abandoned early in favor of an acquisition approach that committed to  numerous ships before proving their capabilities. Cost, schedule, and capability expectations have eroded over time, as shown in the table below. More recently, the Navy attributed a series of engineering casualties on delivered LCS to shortfalls in crew training, seaframe design, and construction quality.

Additionally there is Congressional opposition.

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) plans to hold hearings on the Navy’s frigate program amidst calls to open the competition to more domestic and foreign designs.

“The frigate acquisition strategy should be revised to increase requirements to include convoy air defense, greater missile capability and longer endurance,” (emphasis applied–Chuck)

The high speed requirement has resulted in ships with water jet propulsion systems that are inappropriate for ASW escorts, ships that have relatively short range and poor seakeeping. These characteristics make the ships less capable of independent operation and helicopter launch and recovery in rough weather, particularly for the mono-hull Freedom class. The Aluminum hull, trimaran Independence class has great aviation facilities and a bit better range and cruise speed, but its aluminum hull raises survivability issues.

The Navy now sees that they need a frigate and they chose to meet this requirement using a modified LCS, but the LCS has notable weaknesses that mean it may not have been the best choice. In addition now it seems they see a need for local area airdefense that was not initially considered  According to a recent DefenseNews report, 

“A study group called the Requirement Evaluation Team (RET) has been formed to examine how to add a local air defense capability to the frigates to protect Combat Logistics Force ships – the supply and support ships that bring fuel, ammunition, spare parts and food to warships at sea. The frigate design as currently envisioned is armed with anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles, but only to protect itself.

“The goal, according to a draft document, is – at a minimum – to double the loadout of Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) Block 2 from 8 to 16 or incorporate a Mark 41 vertical launch system with at least 8 Standard SM-2 missiles. The SM-2 is one of the primary anti-air weapons carried by the fleet’s Aegis destroyers and cruises.

“…We’re looking at further increases to survivability, and we’re looking at endurance, pushing the envelope. And as always we’re going to balance that against technical risk and cost.”

Additionally it now appears they may be more expensive than previously reported.

A frigate based on the Offshore Patrol Cutter could be a cheaper and, in many respects, superior alternative.

WHY DO WE NEED FRIGATES AND WHAT SHOULD BE ITS CHARACTERISTICS?

A nation chooses to build frigates rather than destroyers because it needs numbers. They choose to build a frigate rather than smaller corvettes because they want longer range and better sea-keeping.

If you are looking for numbers, it make no sense to build a frigate that cost 75% that of a Burke Class DDG and provides only 50% of the capability. We can’t build enough of them without impacting other programs. The Europeans are making ships like this, but they are not intended to complement destroyers like the Burke class, they are intended to replace them. They are the premier warships of their respective navies.

In navies that actually have destroyers, frigates tend to be around 4,000 tons full load, The Chinese Type 054A are reportedly 4053 tons full load and the Russian Admiral Grigorovich class 4,035 tons full load. South Korea’s Incheon batch II class frigates will be 3,592 tons full load. Japan has recently announced that they will be building two 3,000 ton frigates a year instead a single 5,100 ton destroyer annually (whether this is full load displacement or something less is not clear). The very numerous Oliver Hazard Perry (FG-7) Class were about 4,200 tons full load. While no final official figure has been published, the Offshore Patrol Cutters are also expected to be about 4,000 tons. Any significant modification is likely to make them displace as much or more than the Perry class. 4,000 tons is already larger than any US Navy destroyer of World War II and would have been considered a light cruiser in WWI

Small warships are not the answer for open ocean escort either. When escorting large ships, a small escort may be unable to keep up, regardless of its nominal maximum speed. I had access to the USCGC Duane’s war diary and was a bit surprised to learn that there were instances when, because of weather, the 2,300 ton, 20 knot cutter was out running smaller 1,300 ton World War One design destroyers that were nominally capable of 35 knots. Smaller ships also tend not to have sufficient range for more than theater coastal operations.

WHY NOT BASE A FRIGATE ON AN LCS DESIGN?:

In some respects the LCS look appropriate for conversion to frigates. They are not too small, but are notably cheaper than the Burke class DDGs, and their crews are much smaller than the more than 300 member crew of Burke class destroyers. They are a little smaller than most modern frigates, 3,500 tons for the Freedom (LCS-1) and 3,100 tons for the Independence (LCS-2) class. Unfortunately, the original concept of a very high speed, shallow draft, forward based, modular vessel specializing in Littoral combat has resulted in compromises that make them a poor basis for an Open Ocean Escort Vessel.

The high speed requirement has resulted in crowded machinery spaces that make access for underway repair difficult. They have short legs, likely generate a lot of noise, and are reportedly weight critical.

PRICE COMPARISON:

The last contract for two LCS ran about $550M each. The award to Eastern for construction of up to nine Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) if all options are exercised is $2.38B. That is only $264.4M per ship. Additionally the Coast Guard contract includes a warranty that requires the builder to fix construction errors while the Navy contracts require the Navy to pay for correction of construction faults.

“Upgrading” the existing LCS designs to fill the frigate mission may exacerbate their existing problem with range. A post from Warisboring.com notes:

“The frigate will also be slower than the standard LCS and have shorter range. (emphasis applied–Chuck) All in all, the frigate version “was the least capable option considered” by the Navy out of several alternatives, the report stated.”

It goes on to note,

“But it was the cheapest and quickest to produce … which is the whole point. The Navy is desperate to get ships under construction as older vessels age out. The sailing branch currently fields 274 deployable warships — well under its goal of 300.”

The root of the problem is the LCS’ lightweight building materials — aluminum—and its size and unorthodox shape. In other words, it simply and physically cannot ever be as survivable as an older FFG 7, or Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate.

The GAO notes:

A minor modified LCS could not be modified to the level of vulnerability resistance of the FFG 7 due to LCS weight and design constraints that would prevent adding more physical structure. For example, Navy task force officials told us that approximately 200 tons of additional weight in steel would need to be accommodated in the LCS seaframe designs if the Navy wanted to upgrade it from commercial build standards to more robust, Navy-like specifications like those used for FFG 7. Task force officials told us that this weight increase would have required a major modification to the LCS design or a new ship design.

PAYLOADS vs PLATFORMS:

When Admiral Greenart wrote his seminal article, “Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” published in the July 2012 US Naval institute Proceedings, he said, “We need to move from “luxury-car” platforms–with their built-in capabilities–toward dependable “trucks” that can handle a changing payload selection.”

The LCS are not really luxury cars, but they are sports cars–high strung, expensive to maintain, with outstanding capabilities over a limited range of activities but perhaps impractical for many purposes. The greater the payload you attempt to stuff into them, the less appropriate they appear to be.

Certainly not a sports car, the OPC, by contrast, is an “F-150 pickup,” simple, practical, easy to maintain, with a spacious interior, and fast enough for most purposes, and with optional horsepower upgrades possible if you really want it faster. Recently it seems the required payload is being increased to include 16 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and either 16 ESSM or an 8 cell Mk41 to provide a degree of AAW protection for ships escorted.

OTHER THAN BEING CHEAPER, DOES THE OPC HAVE ANY ADVANTAGES?: 

Actually the Offshore Patrol Cutter enjoys several advantages:

Range: The range we see quoted for the OPC, 10,200 nmi is far more than the 3,500 and 4,300 given for the Freedom and Independence classes respectively. The ranges for the LCS classes is quoted for 18 knots while the range for the OPC is for 14 knots so the range difference is not as great as it may first appear, but even at 18 knots it is likely the OPC will have a range of over 6,500 nmi. That means the OPC will not have to break off operations to refuel as frequently as its LCS counterparts.

Endurance: The OPC is designed for 60 days endurance while the LCSs are only designed for 21 days. Again the OPC will not have to break off operations to replenish as frequently as its LCS counterparts.

Operations in higher sea states: The DHS considered the possibility of replacing OPCs with LCSs but noted that while the OPC is designed to operate both its boats and helicopter in seas up to 4 meters, the LCS was expected to operate boats only to 2.1 meters and helicopters to 3.7 meters.

Quiet Operations for ASW: The water jet propulsion chosen for the LCSs work well at high speed but are relatively noisy and less efficient at low speeds. Additionally the OPCs are designed with “Promas rudders” which are claimed to increase maneuverability, speed, and fuel economy while decreasing noise compared to a conventional propeller/rudder interface.

MODIFYING THE OPC TO FULFILL THE FFG ROLE:

Even before the Requirement Evaluation Team recognized the need for greater air defense capabilities and greater endurance, it was anticipated that the LCS would require major redesign.Quoting a recent Seapower Magazine article “Features Shaping Up for Lockheed Martin’s Frigate Proposal for Navy“,

Patton expects the FF to retain the 118-meter length of the Freedom class, with a steel hull and an aluminum topside. The additional berthing and cooling requirements, along with other hull, mechanical and electrical enhancements, will involve approximately a 40-percent redesign of the ship.(emphasis applied–Chuck)

While I think the OPC could be made a credible warship with relatively few modification, it is likely that the Navy would want to make some changes which I will discuss later.

The OPC has the advantage of having already been designed for a larger crew. Unlike the LCSs, it provides accommodations for 126, very near the expected complement of an FFG.

ASCM and ASW  Installation: The OPC could likely support installation of 16 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs)

Below is a Harpoon installation on a Ticonderoga class cruiser, which has a beam of 55 feet–only one foot greater than that of the Offshore Patrol Cutter. As you can see, moved over to the side, it would not require the entire fantail leaving room on the fantail for ASW equipment. There may also be some room for ASW equipment in the compartment below the fantail.

Below is the Harpoon installation on a 3,600 ton ANZAC class frigate, a smaller ship, which has a beam of 49 ft–five feet less than that of the Offshore Patrol Cutters. A similar installation could be made on the OPC on the O-2 deck between the gun mount and the bridge.

091104-N-3038W-255 GULF OF OMAN (Nov. 4, 2009) The Australian navy frigate HMAS Toowoomba (FFH-156)

ESSM AAW missile installation: The Mk56 launch system provides a relatively light and structurally non-intrusive way to support the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile System. The earlier and 25% heavier Mk48 system was used to provide up to 12 Sea Sparrow vertical launch missile tubes on the 450 ton full load, Danish Flyvefisken class STAN FLEX 300 vessels. The relatively small foot print of the Mk56 VLS system (pdf) can be seen below on a Danish Absalon-class command and support ship (beam 64 feet, ten feet more than the Offshore Patrol Cutter but they provide three twelve launch tube sets for ESSM). Two sets are visible in the foreground, one set of twelve with missile canisters with red tops in place to the right, on the ship’s centerline, and a second set of twelve without canisters to the left. A third set  is off camera to the right. 16 Harpoon launchers are seen in the background. It appears likely the OPC could support two twelve missile sets on the superstructure above the boat davits.

Photo below: Mk48 mod3 VLS for ESSM seen here mounted on the stern of a 450 ton 177 foot Danish StanFlex300 Flyvefisken class patrol boat.  Each tube could contain two, so this small installation could have provided 24 ESSM. The Mk56 launchers replace the Mk48s with an approximate 20% weight savings. (My wife tells me these look like port-a-potties.)

Replace the Mk38 mod2 with SeaRAM: Replacing the 25mm Mk38 mod2 atop the hangar with a SeaRAM would provide a stand alone missile system capable of defending the ship even if all power fails. Hopefully a second SeaRAM could also be provided forward as well.

Without major structural changes I believe the OPC design could be adapted to support

• an ASW system/multifunction towed array
• 16 anti-ship cruise missiles (with possible land attack capability depending on the choice of missile)
• 24 Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles
• At least one, perhaps two, SeaRAM systems
• Plus the planned 57mm Mk110

MAJOR DESIGN CHANGES:

The Navy may want to make additional changes including.

• A bigger gun
• More armor
• Less self noise
• Better radars
• More Speed
• More Missiles

These are all achievable at a cost.

Replace the gun: 

There has already been discussion about the desirability of replacing the 57mm on the LCSs. From the discussion it appears nothing larger would fit on the Independence class and nothing larger than a 76mm could fit on the Freedom class.

I see no reason why, given some strengthening of the structure, OPC based frigates could not be armed with the 5″/62 Mk45 mod4. This would provide much needed Naval Gunfire Support capability and potentially extended range guided projectiles. This is apparently not even an option for the LCS designs. 

The OPC’s 57mm Mk110 occupies some valuable real estate. If it is not replaced by a larger gun, it might be replaced a second SeaRAM system or a Vertical Launch missile system. If replaced by a missile system, it would likely be desirable to provide at least a pair of Mk38 mod3 mounts in place of the planned .50 caliber mounts.

070111-N-4515N-509
Atlantic Ocean (Jan. 9 2007) – Guided missile destroyer USS Forest Sherman (DDG 98) test fires its five-inch gun on the bow of the ship during training. The Sherman is currently conducting training exercises in the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Joshua Adam Nuzzo (RELEASED)

Add armor: This is another area where a displacement hull like the OPC’s would not be as adversely effected by additional weight, than the more exotic hull forms of the LCSs.

Less Self Noise: Making less noise is always an advantage in ASW. The less crowded engine rooms of the OPC probably make providing additional isolation easier. In addition upgrading the hybrid propulsion motors to 1,000 HP, as was considered at one time, would allow the ship to make 13 knots on generators alone.

Replace the radar: The OPC, like the LCSs will have a multifunction radar. This could conceivably be replaced by a more capable radar, including perhaps a scaled down version of the SPY-6.

Extend the hull–for speed: The speed figure we have for the OPC is a sustained speed of 22.5 knots I presume this means that maximum speed in all but the most adverse conditions is about 24 knots. This is enough for most purposes. It will keep up with Navy Amphibs and is faster than most merchant ships, but most frigates tend to have a speed of about 28 knots. That would likely require doubling the horsepower. This could be done by extending the hull amidships about 10 meters (33 feet) to provide what I believe would be a third main machinery space. A gas turbine might be added and would probably boost speed to 29 knots or more, but instead adding two additional diesel engines of the type currently planned would most likely provide 27-28 knots without the complication of another type of engine.

Use the extended hull–for a missile farm: Additional length, added to increase speed, could provide space for additional vertical launch systems amidships. These could be Mk41 systems or the newer Mk57s like those used on the DDG-1000, which are heavier but safer and require less maintenance.

SUMMARY:

Because of its conventional hull and greater displacement it is likely anything that can be added to a LCS can also be added to an OPC. The OPC could likely accept even more additional weapons than either of the LCS designs.

The OPC already enjoys several advantages over the LCSs most notably much longer range.

Modifying existing LCS designs will still involve much work and considerable risk. The OPC may require substantial modification as well, but the OPC already has far more accommodation space and range than either LCS design.

Using the OPC as the basis for a new Navy frigate is likely to save at least $200M per ship compared with similar modifications to a LCS design.

French Navy PLG light patrol vessel La Confiance in combined anti-drug training with US Coast Guard Cutter Winslow Griesser. French Navy picture.

NavyRecognition reports,

“The “La Confiance” PLG (Patrouilleur Léger Guyanais or French Guyana-based Light Patrol Vessel) is now on “Active Duty” and able to conduct operational missions following a ceremony held April 27th…”

It is the first of two small ships of a new class designed specifically for service in the French Atlantic EEZ in the Western Hemisphere. The size is a bit unusual.

They will replace two P400 class patrol craft currently based in French Guyana. The P400s are about the same size as the Webber class “Fast Response Cutters.”

The French do not have an ocean-going coast guard like ours, so their navy does many of the functions performed by the USCG. The new ships make an interesting comparison with the Webber class; I think they even look a bit alike. In many ways the PLG corresponds to what I suggested earlier as cutter X:

…taking the crew and equipment of a Webber class Fast Response Cutter (FRC) and putting them in a larger hull with more endurance and seakeeping, while accepting lower top speed than the FRC.

Comparing the “La Confiance” PLG to the FRCs:

• Displacement: PLG 700 tons; FRC 354 full load
• Crew: 24, same for both, PLG can also accomodate 14 people, special forces for example.
• Dimensions: PLG  60 m (197 ft) x 9.50 m (31.2 ft) x 3.2 m  (10.5 ft); FRC 46.8 m (154 ft) x 8.11 m (26.6 ft) x 2.9 m (9.5 ft)
• Power: PLG 6,000 KW (8,046 HP), FRC 8,600 KW (11,600 HP)
• Speed: PLG 21, FRC 28
• Range: PLG 3,500 nmi at 12 knots, FRC 2,950 at 14 knots
• Endurance: PLG 12 days; FRC 5 days
• Boats: PLG two, FRC one

French Navy La Confiance PLG light patrol vessel arriving in Fort-de-France, Martinique. Picture: E.Mocquillon © Marine nationale

More from the builder here.

The May issue of US Naval Institute Proceedings is the Naval Review issue. It includes updates on the Coast Guard as well as the Navy and Marine corps that are behind the membership pay wall, but it also has an article, “Too Small to Answer the Call,” by Capt. David Ramassini, future CO of USCGC Kimball (WMSL-756) that is accessible to all, and I think is worth a read.

Basically he is advocating using the Coast Guard internationally to build capacity and counter threats of lawlessness and poor governance in trouble spots all around the world. Below is his recommended building program.

Build a New Great White Fleet

Enhancing regional security in partnership with willing nations requires a 21st-century Great White Fleet of forward deployable (or stationed) national security cutters (NSCs), offshore patrol cutters (OPCs), and fast response cutters (FRC). The mix of platforms and duration of presence would be tailored to the distinct geographies and vary based on the receptiveness of the host nation(s), problem sets to be addressed, and mutual goals of the combatant commands and partner nations. Building on a proven bilateral approach for counterdrug operations and EEZ enforcement, the Great White Fleet would leverage existing agreements—based on the extent to which partner governments are willing—to strengthen CTOC (counter transnational organized crime–chuck) and CT (counter terrorism–Chuck) across the JIME (Joint Interagency Multinational Environment–Chuck).

From an acquisition perspective, doubling the size of both the OPC (from 25 to 50) and FRC (from approximately 50 to 100) programs equates to the projected cost of one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78)-class aircraft carrier (approximately $13 billion). Furthermore, procuring an additional seven NSCs over the nine planned would cost the equivalent of one Zumwalt (DDG-1000)-class guided-missile destroyer (approximately $4.2 billion). The NSC and OPC both offer more than three times the on-station time between provisioning than is afforded by a littoral combat ship (LCS).

Building more OPCs also could rapidly grow the National Fleet by leveraging commercial shipyards outside the mainstream industrial complex. These shipyards may be able to provide better value to the government during an economic downturn in the oil and offshore supply industry. Further leveraging this acquisition would continue to drive down the cost of the OPCs and provide an additional industrial base to build a 400-ship National Fleet of ships with far lower operating and maintenance costs than the LCS.

Redirecting proposed future LCS/frigate dollars (approximately $14 billion) to a Great White Fleet to modernize the U.S. National Fleet mix would provide a greater return on investment and more staying power abroad. For instance, building international security cutters—NSCs with Navy-typed/Navy-owned enhancements such as the SeaRAM antiship cruise missile—could offer combatant commanders a truly useful “frigate,” leveraging mature production lines that now operate at only 70 percent capacity. These estimates are for relative comparison and do not include the associated aviation, infrastructure, basing support agreements, and personnel plus-ups that are needed to provide a more credible and persistent presence across the JIME. But investing in a larger Coast Guard and the supporting infrastructure would return high dividends.

I’m not sure I agree, but it is worth considering. We should, however, keep in mind a sentiment expressed by friend Bill Wells that white paint is not bullet proof. We should not perpetuate the idea that only white painted ships can enforce laws, that is a uniquiely American concept and perpetuating it plays into the hands of the Chinese, who have more coast guard ships than any other country in the world.

Still I think there is merit to this concept. It seems to be working for PATFORSWA (Patrol Forces South West Asia). There has already been talk about a similar deployment to SE Asia. We might consider similar detachments of various sizes for West Africa, the Eastern Pacific, and the Marshall Islands.

The additional ships, 7 NSCs, and “doubling the size of both the OPC (from 25 to 50) and FRC (from approximately 50 to 100)” Is clearly arbitrary. There is very little the NSCs can do that the OPCs will not also be able to do cheaper, so I don’t see a need for more NSCs.

If we take on additional international roles it probably will not be done in one fell swoop. It will probably be done incrementally. Captain Ramassini is clearly looking at this as a near term possibility. Some movement in this direction is clearly possible, but it will take a radical change in the Administration, the Navy, and the Coast Guard for this to happen on the scale he envisions.

Meanwhile, if you look at the “Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Study,” the Coast Guard actually needs 9 NSCs, 57 OPCs, and 91 FRCs just to meet all of our statutory obligations. That is not far from his 16 NSCs, 50 OPCs, and 100 FRCs. The study and the “Great White Fleet” would both probide 66 large ships (NSCs and OPCs).

Actually the only way I see this happening is if there is a realization that keeping the USN constantly cycling through distant deployments may not be the best way to maintain readiness. That it wears out very expensive ships and drives people from the service, and that perhaps cutters can perform at least some of the presence missions.

Found this graphic on the US Naval Institute Blog.

Considering that the US Navy is spread all over the globe, with responsibilities in the Atlantic as well the Pacific, while the Chinese Navy will be concentrated in the Western Pacific, far from American Naval bases with the exception of a small number of units in Guam, Japan, and possibly Singapore, the Chinese Navy is likely  to enjoy a considerable local advantage, particularly early in any conflict.

In peacetime, it takes three CONUS based ships to maintain one in the Western Pacific. That would improve in wartime, but the Chinese would always have an advantage. Not to mention Chinese land based air and missiles.

Is there anything the Coast Guard can do to mitigate the coming imbalance in the Western Pacific?

It could be worse if US vs both China and Russia.

NavyRecognition reports on Russian icebreaker development. They have a diverse and very impressive program. Not content with the Arctika class nuclear powered icebreakers, they are now expecting to build even bigger icebreakers, the Project 10510 Leader class.

The Iceberg Design Bureau also is developing the world’s most powerful nuclear icebreaker of the Project 10510 Leader class. According to Ryzhkov, “its power is 120MW and its maximum ice-breaking capability equals 4.3 m, and if ice is 2 m thick, the ship can lead convoys at a speed of more than 11 knots, thus ensuring cost-effective traffic via the Northern Sea Route.”

120 MW, that is about 160,000 HP. That is about twice as powerful as the Polar Star.

There is a lot of interesting stuff in this post.

It is important to remember that most of these program are for the development of the Arctic for Economic purposes. That is not to say the Russians could not turn them to military purposes, but the Russians have ample reason to see them, not so much as military assets, but as economic necessities.