BairdMaritime reports that Taiwan is building four 4,000 ton Coast Guard Cutters. Asian nations tend to use light displacement when reporting their ship size, so these may actually be larger than the Bertholf class National Security Cutters.
The first is expected to enter service in 2021 and all four to be delivered by 2027.
Congressional Research Service has again updated their review of the Coast Guard’s Cutter acquisition programs. (Again only five days after the previous update) The changes reflect the Request for Information (RFI) issued Oct. 18, 2019. You can see the new CRS report here.
The significant changes begin on page 11, and continues through page 14 with quotes from the RFI, and in the “Issues for Congress” section, beginning on page 18 under “Follow-On Competition,” continuing through page 20.
It still seems strange to me that Eastern’s team is not being required to complete the detail design and that the Coast Guard would take the time to develop a second detail design.
As I understand, it the design team is Vard. They should not have been significantly effected by the hurricane that struck Eastern. Have they been unable to complete a detail design? Shouldn’t they be able to complete one before the re-compete contracts for design studies, evaluates design studies, awards another contract, and completes a second detail design? That the Coast Guard is considering this course make be suspicious that that something is terribly wrong within the Eastern team. I hope I am wrong.
It is gratifying to note that two posts from this blog are referenced in the report:
There is much more detail in the VARD brochure and Wikipedia entry linked above, but a few significant data points.
Displacement, full load: 23,500 tons
Length overall: 150.1 m 492’-6”
Length waterline: 137.6 m 451’-5”
Breadth moulded 28.0 m 91’-10”
Design draft: 10.5 m 34’-6”
Generators: 39,600 kW 53,100 hp
Propulsion: two 11 MW (14,751 hp) wing shafts and a 12 MW (16,092 hp) azimuth thruster. total 34 MW (45,595 hp),
Speed: 18 knots ice free, 3.0 kn, 2.5m ice
Range: 26,000 NM @ 12 kn ice free
1,800 NM @ 3.0 kn 2.2 m of ice
60 core crew + 40 program personnel
Endurance 270 days
For comparison these are figures for the planned Polar Security Cutter. Projected delivery dates, 2024, 2025, 2027.
Displacement, Full Load: 22,900 tons
Length: 460 ft (140 meters)
Beam: 88 ft (26.8 meters)
HP: 45,200
Accommodations: 186
Endurance: 90 days
In many ways the designs are remarkably close. Looks like the Canadian breaker will be slightly larger than the PSC, but will have a much smaller crew.
Presumably there will be no provision for armament since the Canadian Coast Guard does not arm its vessels.
The Diefenbaker’s very long endurance is a bit of a surprise, in view of Canada’s lack of a requirement to go to Antarctica, a feature that has driven the design of the PSC.
Propulsion power is almost identical, a bit over 45,000 HP, and both designs include three propellers, but the way it is done is different. While the PSC has a conventional shaft on the centerline and rotatable drive units to port and starboard, the Canadian design has a single rotating drive unit on the centerline and conventional shaft driven props port and starboard. This may provide the PSC with a redundancy advantage in that it might allow steerage even if one unit is damaged. On the other hand the single Canadian unit may be less likely to be damaged because of its position.
A draft statement of work (SOW) was released by the Coast Guard Nov. 22 in support of the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) Program. The service is seeking industry feedback; responses to the draft SOW will be used to inform a future solicitation for industry studies to support OPC follow-on production.
Looking at the draft statement of work, one of the first things I noticed is that it describes the OPC as “360ft LOA and 4500LT.” I think that displacement should be full load. Even at that, it is significantly larger than previously stated. I had previously noted that dimensions and displacement did not seem to correspond, that the dimension for the OPC was larger than the Holland class OPV which are 3750 tons full load, but previous statements indicated that the ships would be 3730 tons full load. This was repeated in the Congressional Research Service Reports. If their full load displacement is actually 4500 tons, that means they are almost exactly the same size as the National Security Cutters which have been variously reported as 4500 or 4600 tons full load.
The draft SOW indicates, “The re-competed contract scope will be to complete the OPC Detail Design and to construct an initial OPC using that Detail Design, with options for constructing up to 10 additional OPCs.”
Section 2.2.2.2 does at least mention the possibility of a block buy.
“The impact of block buys of OPCs as a cost reduction strategy shall be addressed in this section.”
The draft SOW states:
“References Available at Award. The following references will be made available not later than award of the Industry Studies contract.
1. Updated draft OPC System Specification
2. List of Long Lead Time Materials (LLTM)
3. Selected Detail Design Deliverables for information only, including Functional Design artifacts, ABS design review information, Transitional (3D) Design artifacts, Production Design artifacts, Schedules, Test Procedures, and Test Reports. The maturity of the Functional Design artifacts exceeds 95%.
4. Selected Construction Deliverables for information only, including: Equipment Configuration List, Test results, Engineering Change documents, and schedules
5. Selected Non-Proprietary Management Planning Deliverables for information only
6. USCG Notional OPC Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) Schedule
7. Placemat summarizing OPC Functional Design “
Frankly, I don’t see how you could bid on the contract without having this information first.
The notional schedule does not appear to have changed, meaning, if followed, the contract will not be awarded until the end of FY2022, and the first ship (OPC#5) will not be delivered until near the end of FY2026 and the last ship of the class will not be delivered until near the end of FY2037, three years after the previous plan. At that time the youngest 270 would be 56 years old. We will not have fourteen OPCs to replace the 210s until 2032, by which time the youngest 210 will be 63 years old. This is starting to look ridiculous, but it does looks like there may be some flexibility.
“Contractors will evaluate the referenced design artifacts and propose their most cost effective and schedule efficient plan to transition the Functional Design into a Production Design and to construct OPCs per the contract scope described above. “
This has to be very frustrating. We already went through a year of proposal evaluations, a year of competing preliminary designs, and a year of detail design, and now it looks like we are starting over almost from ground zero.
I anticipate these ships are going to cost considerably more than the original Eastern contract or the original benchmark cost. That, and the considerable delay, are a good argument for funding a 12th NSC in FY2020.
Hopefully the contractors would offer options that would depart from the notional timeline and allow earlier completion of the program as a cost reduction strategy.
On the other hand, if we are going to take this much time, maybe we could make the ship a bit faster and better armed, since it appears we are firmly back in the great power competition mode.
I have been talking about the OPC for over nine years, and it is frustrating to see what appeared to be real progress toward impressive new ships come apart, but with the Offshore Patrol Cutter program in flux, perhaps it would be worthwhile to look at where we are, where do we want to go, and what the current restraints and limitations are. Maybe there is a better way.
As currently envisioned the last OPCs are not expected to be funded until FY2034 nor delivered until 2037. A lot can happen between now and then.
Where are we?
The current thinking is to provide contract relief for Eastern and allow them to build the first four ships. Meanwhile the Coast Guard will recompete a contract for OPC #5 with options for #6-15.
But even this is uncertain. Congress has 60 days from the announcement (11 Oct. 2019 to 10 Dec.?) to consider the proposed contract relief. If I interpret correctly, unless they take action to deny relief, construction will go ahead. That suggest that denial of contract relief is unlikely, but by no means, are we sure it will happen.
It seems likely we will get four OPCs from Eastern, but even that is uncertain. Really we have no assurance we will get any OPCs at all.
What do we need? What are the constraints?:
We should have begun replacing the WMECs we have now, 25 years ago, so the need is urgent. We can also be pretty sure we need more large cutters (those of over 1000 tons full load) than are currently planned.
Realistically we cannot expect great increases in either PC&I (Procurement, Construction, and Improvement) or operating budget. That means, hopefully, the Coast Guard will get around the $2B/year PC&I successive Commandants have been saying we will need, but probably little or no more, and further, that we should not expect significant personnel increases.
The current plan will provide fewer large cutters than we have now. Eleven NSCs are replacing twelve WHECs and 25 OPCs are expected to replace 29 WMECs. That is 36 to replace 41. In fact if you look back a little further the Coast Guard had even more large ships. Editions of Combat Fleets of the World for the years indicated show that in 1990/91 we had 50 and in 2000/2001 there were 44. The Fleet Mix Study conducted more than a decade ago indicated we actually need an even larger fleet.
The need to rapidly replace the existing WMECs and ultimately expand the fleet, within the constraints of budget and manpower are in direct conflict, particularly when the cutters have become bigger and more expensive and their crews size has, with few exceptions increased.
Replace the WMECs we have ASAP:
The WMECs we have need to be replaced as soon as possible. If the recompete goes as expected, the fourteenth OPC will not replace the last 210 until fourth quarter FY2032. That 210 will be over 63 years old. The last 270 decommissioned will be at least 48 years old. We can only expect that these vessels will have increasingly frequent major machinery casualties. The high number of major casualties that were experienced when the Coast Guard responded to the earthquake in Haiti is only a taste of what we can expect in the future.
More Cutters:
The Fleet Mix Study of 2009 showed we needed 66 large cutters to fully accomplish all the Coast Guard’s statutory missions. A 2011 revision reduced the total to 58.
That number was perhaps artificially low because it assumed the “Crew Rotation Concept” would be applied to all National Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters, allowing an unrealistically high 225 days away from home. We have, to some extent, seen Webber class step up to perform some of these missions, but the need for more large ships is still apparent.
Unfortunately we have not updated the Fleet mix study based on more recent experience with the NSC and FRC. We really need to do that so that we can make more informed decisions and present a better case to Congress.
PC&I Budget
The FY2019 Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) budget was $2,248.26M, of that less than $1.6M went to ship construction and improvement. It is unlikely we will see significantly larger budgets devoted to ship construction, and this includes funding for Polar Security Cutter, in service sustainment, and in the out years WPB replacement, and possibly new buoy tenders. We don’t unfortunately have any comprehensive long term shipbuilding plan that looks beyond five years.
Operating Budget/Crew Costs
Personnel costs are particularly important in overall lifecycle cost calculations. These come out of the operating budget which has actually shrunk in real terms.
The fleet that is being replaced (12 WHECs, 29 WMECs, and 44 WPBs) and the projected fleet, as currently planned (11 NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 64 FRCs) have almost the same total crew count, but it is doing so with the five fewer large cutters. The more numerous Webber class cutters have a larger crew than the 110 foot WPBs, 24 vice 16. Ultimately I expect 64 FRC to replace the 44 WPB110s for an increase of 832 billets. The OPCs will apparently have a crew of about 100, about the same as that of the 270s, but about 25 more than are currently assigned to 210 foot WMECs. Replacing 14 of 210s with OPCs will add about 350 billets. Only the National Security Cutters have smaller crews than the ships they have replaced. My Combat Fleets of the World shows the crew of the NSCs to be 122 and that of the 378s to be 177, eleven NSCs compared to twelve WHEC378s would be decrease of 782 billets.
By my count the Legacy fleet of 85 vessels (12 WMECs when the NSCs started building, 28 WMECs when the OPCs started building, and 44 WPBs when the FRCs started building) required 5,349 billets. (The nominal fleet the program of record supposedly replaced included 29 WMECs and 49 WPBs, would have included another 179 billets or 5,528.) The currently planned fleet of 100 vessels (11 NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 64 FRCs) requires 5,378 billets.
If we are to increase the number of larger cutters while leaving the total number of billets little changed, we would need to trade off some of the OPCs for more numerous vessels with smaller crews.
The Alternatives:
The first question is, is the OPC, as currently designed, the vessel we still want?
While I don’t think it will happen, in view of the increasing likelihood of a great power conflict, the wisest thing that could happen, is that we replace the OPCs with what ever design the Navy chooses for the new FFG. That would take a massive infusion of cash and manpower, not going to happen.
If we reopen the competition to include other designs built to the same requirements we not only complicate logistics and training in the future, we also probably delay the decision process another year. Looks like the Coast Guard is trying to avoid that. They have a design they like, and once production is underway, it will certainly be cheaper than the NSCs.
Do we want a ship built to different requirements, maybe something like my proposed Cutter X? The Coast Guard came up with the requirements for the OPC, so I have to assume that for at least some missions, we need ships that meet those requirements. (I understand that the first two OPCs will go to Kodiak.) On the other hand, several years ago, Congress asked the Coast Guard if there weren’t missions or geographic areas that did not require ability to conduct helicopter and boat operations in such severe conditions? That question was apparently never answered, as far as I know, but we know for a fact that less capable ships have been performing these missions for decades. We see it in the way the fleet was distributed. Most 378s went to the Pacific where long distances and ALPAT demanded great range and seakeeping. 210s generally went to the West Coast and SE and Gulf coasts where the weather tended to be more benign. 270s tended to based further North in the Atlantic since they were more seaworthy than the 210, if not as capable as the 378s.
We have a mixed fleet of WMECs, perhaps their replacements should be a mixed fleet as well, allowing the more robust OPCs to be used where those characteristics are most likely to be needed, while we also build more smaller, cheaper ship to provide the numbers we need. As before, I will refer to this class, slotted between the OPCs and the Webber class WPCs as Cutter X.
Considering Cutter X, to be significantly cheaper than the OPCs and have a significantly smaller crew, we probably should look to designs that are half the size of the OPC or smaller. That does not mean these ships will be small. In fact they could be larger than any of the existing WMECs, and more than twice the size of the 210s. The 327 foot Treasury class WHECs would qualify in terms of size. Average procurement cost for the OPCs, before the need for contract relief surfaced was $421M per ship. Cutter X should cost less than $250M. Actually it should be possible to build them for less than $200M.
I have pointed to a number of designs that might be considered, but to offer a concrete example, consider the Fassmer OPV-80 design used by the German Police Coast Guard, and the Navies of Chile, Colombia, and Honduras. It can operate and hangar a medium sized helicopter, has two boats on davits and a third larger boat on a stern ramp, and can be armed with a medium caliber gun up to 76mm. The German versions are getting Bofors 57mm guns like those used by the Coast Guard. Its crew is 40 or less.
I will offer what I believe to be a possible alternative to the current plan with the objective of replacing the aging fleet as rapidly as possible, ultimately increasing the number of larger patrol ships in the fleet and keeping the budget and manpower similar to what we have been experiencing.
In looking at an alternative program there a number of milestones that might be considered.
When would we replace all the 210s? At this point we should have at least 26 new generation large cutters (replacing 12 WHECs and 14 WMEC210s). This is currently planned to occur in 2032.
When would we get to 36 new generation large cutters currently planned? Now FY2037.
What kind of fleet will we have at the end of FY2037? Current plan 11 NSCs and 25 OPCs.
The proposal is in three parts:
Proceed with the OPC program as currently envisioned funding one OPC per yearthrough FY2025. In FY2026 and 2027, fund one, rather than two, and halt the program at ten ship with the last delivered in 2030.
Continue to fund one NSC a year through FY2023, this will give us 15 NSCs, with the last delivered in 2026.
Start a program for Cutter X in FY2021. Fund construction for the first ship in FY2024, then two ships in FY2025 to 2027, then three ships a year in FY 2028 to 2034 (the last year for the current plan). This will provide a total of 28 ships with the last delivered FY2037.
This breaks down to:
FY2020 to FY2023 we would fund one NSC and one OPC,
FY2024 we fund one OPC and the first Cutter X.
FY2025 to FY2027 we build one OPC and two Cutter X (which should cost the same as two OPCs).
From FY2028 through 2034 we fund three Cutter X per year (which should cost less than two OPCs).
This is how the benchmarks break down:
When would we replace all the 210s? At this point we should have at least 26 new generation large cutters (replacing 12 WHECs and 14 WMEC210s). This is currently planned to occur in 2032. In 2025, 15 NSCs, 8 OPCs, three Cutter X (plus 13 WMEC270)
When would we get to 36 new generation large cutters currently planned? Now FY2037. In 2029, by the end of the year, 38 ships, 15 NSCs, 10 OPCs, 13 cutter X.
What kind of fleet will we have at the end of FY2037? Current plan 11 NSCs and 25 OPCs. At the end of FY 2037, 53 ships, 15 NSCs, 10 OPCs, 28 cutter X.
At the end of FY2037 we will have effectively replace the 12 WHEC and the 13 WMEC270s with 25 more capable NSCs and OPCs. The 14 WMEC210 and Alex Haley will have been replace by Cutter X and 13 additional large cutters added to the fleet, 17 more than the current plan.
Even if we did not fund NSCs 13-15, it would only take one additional year to replace the 210s and to reach 36 new generation ships. and we would still have 50 ships at the end of FY2037.
We really need to do a new Fleet Mix Study and we need to follow it up with a long term shipbuilding plan, something Congress has been asking for for years.
German Customs 24 meter patrol boat. Photo by Jarek Jõepera
Bairdmaritime reports delivery of three new 24 meter patrol boats designed and built for Germany’s Customs Agency.
A unique aspect of the design is the bow. We have seen other novel bow designs, including the Ulstein X-bow and the Damen Axe-bow. These bows reduce pitch compared to conventional bow designs, but unless the foc’sle is raised, these designs tend to be wet forward. There is also a very unique bow on the new Italian Patrol Frigate.
Additional advantages of the longer waterline, that comes with extending the bow forward, can be increased speed or improved fuel efficiency.
My gut feeling is, I like the look of this particular bow. The idea seems to be that when a swell rises up over the wedge shape we see just above the waterline, it generates a down force, counteracting to some extent the normal tendency of the bow to lift, reducing pitch much of the time. But unlike a axe bow, there is still a flare to the bow that would tend to keep the bow above the green water when conditions get really bad. Looks like it might be worth a look, and maybe some testing.
To no one’s surprise MarineLog reports that Davie Shipbuilding, Lauzon, Quebec, Canada’s largest shipyard, has been selected as the third shipyard partner in Canada’s “National Shipbuilding Strategy” and will build six icebreakers for the Canadian Coast Guard.
Earlier I noted that the Chinese seemed to be building an incredible number of warships. Found this chart of surface warships launched in 2019. I have been unable to find the original source, the style appears to be from http://www.military-today.com/, but in any case, it appears to be correct.
By way of comparison, over the last five years, 2015 through 2019, as nearly as I can tell, the US Navy commissioned 15 Littoral Combat Ships, five Burke class destroyers, two Zumwalt class destroyers, two LPDs, no big deck amphibs (LHD or LHA), and one aircraft carrier. That is 25 surface warships total. The conclusion is a bit startling.
The Chinese launched more surface warships in 2019, than the US Navy commissioned in the last five years.
The 19th and 20th Type 052D destroyers are launched in Dalian on May 10 (Image: 香港 文匯 網)
The LCS program is coming to an end, but there are still 16 to be commissioned. Generally the program has funded four per year, The FFG(X) program is expected to replace the LCS program in the Navy budget with one FFG funded in the first year followed by two frigates in each year to a total of 20. Combined with the LCS this should give the Navy 55 “small surface combatants.” The Chinese have about 50 frigates but this number is likely to decline as older ships are decommissioned, as their current frigate program, the Type 054A, is nearing completion.
The USN’s Zumwalt class destroyer program will end with three ships when the Lyndon B. Johnson is commissioned in the near future.
The Burke class DDG program was expected to continue building twelve ships over the next five years, but there has been a recent report that DOD would like to cut five ships to make room in the budget for development of more unmanned systems. Also suggested is that Ticonderoga class cruisers be retired early and that the first four LCS be decommissioned.
It is comforting to assume that Chinese systems and their training are inferior. We had similar assumptions about the Japanese before WWII. It is extremely dangerous to assume your own superiority. Plus while the US Forces spread all over the world, the Chinese are concentrated in their own theater of interest.
The Congressional Research Service has again updated its look at cutter procurement. (Note, this link will take you to the latest version of the report and is subject to change with each update.) While I cannot be sure there are no other changes, I believe the significant changes are a reflection of the result of the House and Senate Conference Committee. From page 25.
Conference In final action, the FY2020 DHS Appropriations Act became Division D of H.R. 1158, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020. The explanatory statement for Division D of H.R. 1158/P.L. 116-93 of December 20, 2019, provides the funding levels shown in the appropriation conference column of Table 2. The explanatory statement for Division D of H.R. 1158 states: The agreement [for the Coast Guard’s Procurement, Construction, and Improvements account] provides an increase of $537,850,000 above the request, including … $260,000,000 for a total of four FRCs…. The bill makes available $100,500,000 for long lead time material for a twelfth National Security Cutter, consistent with the direction in the House Report….
I have reproduced Table 2 from page 21 of the report below. The following explanatory note is quoted from the CRS report:
“Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Coast Guard’s FY2020 budget submission, HAC committee report, and SAC chairman’s mark and explanatory statement on FY2020 DHS Appropriations Act. HAC is House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.”
Summary of Appropriations Action on FY2020 Acquisition Funding Request
Table 2 summarizes appropriations action on the Coast Guard’s request for FY2020 acquisition funding for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs.
Table 2. Summary of Appropriations Action on FY2020 Acquisition Funding Request Figures in millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Request______Request______HAC_______SAC_____Final
NSC program ____60 _______160.5 _______60 _____160.5
OPC program ___457 _______457 _______457 ______312
FRC program ___140 _______290 _______240 ______260
TOTAL _________657 ______907.5 ______757 ______732.5
So again Congress is providing funding above that requested by the administration.
The increase from two to four Webber class is consistent with previous Congressional action, and should actually result in a savings over the life of the program, in that it is in line with the current contract options and will not require a renegotiation that might have raised the cost of individual cutters by up to $10M. That means a total of 62 Webber class will have been funded. Only two additional in FY2021 are planned, for a total of 64, 58 in the program of record plus six for PATFORSWA to support CENTCOM, but I would not be surprised to see four in the final FY2021 budget.
The addition of $100.5M for Long Lead Time items for a twelfth National Security Cutter looks like a strong commitment to fund another Bertholf class National Security Cutter.
Relative to the OPC program, from page 26:
OPC Program.- The contract awarded to construct the OPC was recently amended to address increased cost estimates after the Acting Secretary determined that relief permitted under Public Law 85-804 was appropriate and necessary to the national defense. An associated delay in delivery of the first two hulls reduced the fiscal year 2020 requirement for the OPC by $145,000,000. Funds included in the agreement continue necessary program requirements. The agreement maintains the commitment to ensuring the Coast Guard can continue the program of record for these critical vessels. As a condition of the granted relief, the vendor will be subject to increased oversight, including additional scrutiny of the costs borne by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard shall brief the Committees quarterly on the metrics used to evaluate adherence to production timelines and costs, including those attributed to reestablishing the production line and maintaining the skilled workforce required to ensure contract performance.
So Congress is going to let the decision to allow extraordinary relief to Eastern Shipbuilding go ahead. The reduction of OPC funding that had been requested is only due to delays in the program and presumably the deletion of long lead time materials for OPC #5 from the payments that had been planned for Eastern.
Image Analysis of photo of Chinese shipyard showing multiple warships at various stages of … [+]H I Sutton, with permission from @Loongnaval
The US Naval War College Digital Commons has made available an evaluation of China’s new 12,000 ton cruiser, the type 055, and its place in the PLAN based primarily on Chinese sources. It looks to be balanced and talks about both the ships and the systems on board.
Defense News reports that it appears likely that four European countries and perhaps more will join forces to build a class of 3000 ton patrol vessels.
The two firms (Italy’s Fincantieri and France’s Naval Group–Chuck) are hoping to match Italian and French navy requirements with a jointly built, modular vessel that can handle patrol and surveillance missions as well as taking second-tier roles in anti-submarine and anti-surface missions.
The vessels these ships are to replace, perform their respective countries offshore coast guard missions.
The project is one of many being supported by an EU initiative called “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PESCO) that is to be supported by the entire EU community. It sounds like this may be heading toward a shipbuilding version of Airbus.
French Navy Floreal class surveillance Frigate, FS Ventose
The French Navy intends to replace the six ships of the Floreal class. These “surveillance frigates” are scattered among France’s overseas territories. They have no ASW capability, but are equipped with a pair of Exocet anti-ship missiles (ASCM).
Italy expects to retire the ten ships of the Cassiopea, Sirio, and Commandanti classes 2022-2025. These ships are all about 1500 tons. They have neither ASW equipment or ASCMs.
The Greeks don’t seem to have any ships in this class, but may now see a need.
Spanish Navy Meteoro class OPV Tornado. Photo from Sergio Acosta, via Wikipedia
I was a bit surprised that Spain would join in this effort. They have their own OPV designs supplied by Navantia, and they have been doing pretty well. They have been produced a class of six referred to as BAM, and were expected to procure six more of the same class. In addition they have produced corvettes for Venezuela and have been contracted to produce five corvettes for Saudi Arabia. Navantia had teamed with Bath Iron Works to provide BIW’s proposal for the USCG OPC program, and they are on BIW’s FFG(X) team. It may be that they feel they have to join now or risk being excluded in the future.
If these ships come equipped as indicated in the diagram at the head of the article, they will be significantly better armed than the ships they replace. They will be a bit larger than the French ships being replaced and more than twice as large as the Italian ships being replaced.
It appears they will be very close in size to the Coast Guard’s Argus Class OPCs, being the same length (110 meters or 360 feet) and only slightly narrower.
The Congressional Research Service has once again updated their report on the Polar Security Cutter. You can see the whole report here. I have reproduced the one page summary below. The entire report is a 63 page pdf.
Summary
The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar icebreakers. The PSC program has received a total of $1,169.6 million (i.e., about $1.2 billion) in procurement funding through FY2020, including $135 million in FY2020, which was $100 million more than the $35 million that the Coast Guard had requested for FY2020. With the funding it has received through FY2020, the first PSC is now fully funded and the second PSC has received initial funding.
The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2021 budget requests $555 million in procurement funding for the PSC program. It also proposes a rescission of $70 million in FY2020 funding that Congress had provided for the procurement of long lead time materials (LLTM) for a 12th National Security Cutter (NSC), with the intent of reprogramming that funding to the PSC program. The Coast Guard states that its proposed FY2021 budget, if approved by Congress, would fully fund the second PSC.
The Coast Guard estimates the total procurement costs of the three PSCs as $1,039 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) for the first ship, $792 million for the second ship, and $788 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $2,619 million (i.e., about $2.6 billion). Within those figures, the shipbuilder’s portion of the total procurement cost is $746 million for the first ship, $544 million for the second ship, and $535 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated shipbuilder’s cost of $1,825 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion).
On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the PSC program awarded a $745.9 million fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to VT Halter Marine of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard owned by Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. VT Halter was the leader of one of three industry teams that competed for the DD&C contract. The first PSC is scheduled to begin construction in 2021 and be delivered in 2024, though the DD&C contract includes financial incentives for earlier delivery.
The DD&C contract includes options for building the second and third PSCs. If these options are exercised, the total value of the contract would increase to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion). The figures of $745.9 million and $1,942.8 million cover only the shipbuilder’s costs; they do not include the cost of government-furnished equipment (GFE), which is equipment for the ships that the government purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ship, or government program-management costs. When GFE and government programmanagement costs are included, the total estimated procurement cost of the first PSC is between $925 million and $940 million, and the total estimated procurement cost of the three-ship PSC program is about $2.95 billion.
The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of Polar Star until the delivery of at least the second PSC. The Coast Guard is using Polar Sea as a source of spare parts for keeping Polar Star operational.
Interest in building follow-on Offshore Patrol Cutters is definitely alive and well. The Acquisitions Directorate, CG-9, has issued nine contracts for industry studies. All these contracts went to shipbuilder. I have reproduced their report below. Hopefully this will lead to a better and more producible design.
March 20, 2020 — The Coast Guard announced the award of nine Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) industry studies contracts March 20, 2020. These awards support the Coast Guard’s strategy to mitigate OPC program risk and complete the program of record by establishing a new, fair and open competitive environment to complete the OPC program of record. Industry studies contracts were awarded to:
Austal USA, LLC of Mobile, Alabama: $2.0 million base award ($3.0 million total potential value)
Bath Iron Works of Bath, Maine: $2.0 million base award ($3.0 million total potential value)
Bollinger Shipyards Lockport LLC of Lockport, Louisiana: $2.0 million base award ($3.0 million potential value)
Eastern Shipbuilding Group, Inc. of Panama City, Florida: $1.1 million base award ($1.2 million potential value)
Fincantieri Marinette Marine of Marinette, Wisconsin: $2.0 million base award ($3.0 million total potential value)
General Dynamics/NASSCO of San Diego, California: $2.0 million base award ($3.0 million total potential value)
Huntington Ingalls, Inc. of Pascagoula, Mississippi: $2.0 million base award ($3.0 million total potential value)
Philly Shipyard, Inc. of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: $2.0 million base award ($3.0 million total potential value)
VT Halter Marine Inc. of Pascagoula, Mississippi: $2.0 million base award ($2.9 million total potential value)
Under their respective contracts, the awardees will assess OPC design and technical data, provided by the Coast Guard, and the program’s construction approach. Based on their analyses, the awardees will recommend to the Coast Guard potential strategies and approaches for the follow-on detail design and construction (DD&C). The awardees will also discuss how they would prepare the OPC functional design for production. The awardees may also identify possible design or systems revisions that would be advantageous to the program if implemented, with strategies to ensure those revisions are properly managed.
The Coast Guard will use the industry studies results to further inform its follow-on acquisition strategy and promote a robust competitive environment for the DD&C award. Participation in industry studies is not a pre-requisite for submitting a DD&C proposal.
The OPCs will replace the service’s aging medium endurance cutters, which are becoming increasingly expensive to maintain and operate. The OPCs will bridge the capabilities of the national security cutters, which patrol the open ocean, and the fast response cutters, which serve closer to shore.
The current OPC DD&C contract is for up to four hulls. The contract was adjusted as part of a request made by the incumbent, Eastern Shipbuilding Group (ESG), for extraordinary relief under the authority of Public Law 85-804 was granted by the Department of Homeland Security. The request was a result of devastation caused when Hurricane Michael – a Category 5 storm – made landfall in Panama City, Florida, on October 10, 2018. Hurricane Michael caused extensive damage to the ESG’s shipyard and the Panama City region.
Evaluations of the innovative gate rudder assembly have shown improvements in both efficiency and maneuverability. (Image: copyright: Yamanaka Shipbuilding)
“Wärtsilä has signed an agreement that will enable it to integrate patented gate rudders into its propulsion product designs. Unlike the traditional arrangement of the rudder in the propeller slipstream, the gate rudder is a twin arrangement around the propeller, allowing improved fuel efficiency and reduced emissions. The concept is applicable to all current vessels equipped with conventional propellers.”
“…the rudder will realize synergies in capital and operational savings for ship owners by increasing fuel efficiency, improving maneuverability and course stability in both calm and rough sea conditions, while also reducing noise and vibration.”
You can see from the photo, when no rudder is required, that the rudder would not be in the accelerated flow behind the prop, thereby reducing drag, but when more extreme turns are required it would be, making it more effective.
The large bosses where the rudder shaft leave the hull might cause more drag than those of a normal rudder. There are of course two required, and it appears they would have to be more strongly built to deal with the torque resulting from the off-center drag on the rudder.
Above: Artists rendering from Eastern Shipbuilding Group
Contract for the Second Offshore Patrol Cutter, the future USCGC Chase, and long lead time items for the third. Presumably this is a contract modification, rather than the exercise of a contract option, because the price is higher than the original option. Still this does not look a great deal higher than the previous contract ($317.5M), for the first OPC and long lead time items for the second. Following from the Acquisitions Directorate, CG-9:
The U.S. Coast Guard modified its contract with Eastern Shipbuilding Group (ESG) April 2 to begin construction of the second Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) and to acquire long lead-time material (LLTM) for the third OPC. Contract delivery of the second OPC, to be named Chase, is scheduled to occur in 2023.
The total value of the construction and LLTM orders is $343 million. In addition to ordering construction of the second OPC, this contracting action also covers the initial order of components and materials necessary to support the future construction of the third OPC by acquiring propeller and steering components, marine diesel engines, the ship integrated control system, switchboards, and generators.
The lead OPC is currently in production at ESG’s shipyard in Panama City, Florida. Production of the lead cutter, Argus, commenced January 7, 2019. Delivery of Argus is scheduled for 2022.
The OPC meets the Service’s long-term need for cutters capable of deploying independently or as part of task groups and is essential to stopping smugglers at sea, interdicting undocumented migrants, rescuing mariners, enforcing fisheries laws, responding to disasters and protecting our ports. The acquisition of 25 OPCs will complement the capabilities of the Service’s National Security Cutters, Fast Response Cutters and Polar Security Cutters as an essential element of the Department of Homeland Security’s layered security strategy.
The April edition of U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding has a short article written by Coast Guard Lieutenants James Martin and Jasper Campbell discussing the recapitalization of the 87 foot WPB fleet and suggesting adaptation of the Navy’s MkVI patrol boat as a replacement.
Any choice of a new class of ships for the Coast Guard must depend on how it will integrate into the legacy fleet. Choices are strongly influenced by the strengths and weaknesses of the other assets available.
Marine Protector class cutter, USCGC Barracuda (WPB-87301), USCG photo
In FY2021 the Coast Guard expects to decommission eight of the 87 foot Marine Protector class without replacement. This change is justified as follows,
This initiative decommissions eight 87-foot Marine Protector Class CPBs. This initiative is based on the acquisition of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) and Response Boat – Medium (RB-M), both of which are more capable than the legacy assets that they replace. Decommissioning these assets focuses patrol boat funding on operating and supporting new assets, such as the FRCs, as well as other strategic priorities. Forecasted material condition as assessed by the Coast Guard’s Patrol Boat Product Line will be a factor in identifying the specific cutter hulls to be decommissioned, ensuring that the cutters with the best material condition remain operational.
Overall fleet performance degradation will be minimized since FRCs outperform previous patrol boats and RB-Ms are more capable than previous boats. Finally, the decommissionings will focus on areas where the combination of FRCs and RB-Ms provides sufficient capability to remove the operational need for an 87-foot CPB
What they really seem to be saying is that RB-M, unlike the boats they replaced, are able to do some of the missions the WPBs were intended to do. On the other hand the 110 foot Island class WPBs were already more capable than the 87 footers so its not like the 87 footers were doing missions the 110s could not. The real difference here may be that, because we now have more larger patrol craft, both Webber and Island class than we did previously, we don’t need as many Marine Protector Class.
Nevertheless it does appear that the Coast Guard sees a need for some WPBs. The USNI article refers to a 2018 statement by the Commandant that, “Recurring Depot Availability Program (RDAP) is anticipated to extend the service life of the 87s well into 2030.”
The capability gaps between the Marine Protector class and the smaller boats below them in size, now RB-ms, has shrunk, while the gap between them and the larger Patrol craft, soon to be all FRCs, has grown. This suggests that any replacement should be, if anything, more capable than the Marine Protector class, not less. While faster and more heavily armed, than the 87 foot WPBs, it appears that the MkVI is less capable in terms of characteristics the Coast Guard values. They have less endurance, appear less seaworthy, and as currently configured, the only boats they can launch are flat bottomed rubber raiding craft.
It appears, any WPB replacement’s capabilities should move closer to those of the FRC rather than the RB-M. Still I see their role as much different from that of the Webber class. The Webbers would be used primarily on regularly scheduled patrols while the WPB replace would be the true “Fast Response Cutters,” on standby for developing emergencies.
I offered a description of my concept of a WPB replacement earlier, including concepts of operation and manning, explaining why it should be larger, faster, and better armed. There was additional discussion about the concept here. My suggestion was that it should be one and a half to twice as large as the 87 foot WPBs and about half the size of the 353 ton Webber class…136 to 182 tons full load, or roughly 100′ (30.5 meter) to 130′ (39.6 meter) in length, not too much different from the Island class cutter, 110 feet (33.5 meter) loa and 168 tons.
I also saw it being uniquely equipped to fill a current gap in our Port, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission, that of being able to defend our critical ports, by being able to forcibly stop any vessel, regardless of its size, speed, or maneuverability.
Such a ship would also be both of interest for Foreign Military Sales and as a reserve element for potential combat roles.
200430-N-NO101-150 WASHINGTON (April 30, 2020) An artist rendering of the guided-missile frigate FFG(X). The new small surface combatant will have multi-mission capability to conduct air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare, and information operations. (U.S. Navy graphic/Released)
The Navy has announced that the contract for the first of the new FFG(X) class frigates has been awarded to Marinette Marine.
“Navy awarded a contract to design and produce the next generation small surface combatant, the Guided Missile Frigate (FFG(X)) today. The contract for detail design and construction (DD&C) of up to 10 Guided Missile Frigates (consisting of one base ship and nine option ships) was awarded to Marinette Marine Corporation (MMC) of Marinette, Wisconsin, officials announced. “
One of the arguments for continuing the construction of the National Security Cutters (NSC) has been that it kept a production line open that might roll into production of the FFG(X). That is now no longer the case. The argument that we are replacing 12 ships, so we should build 12 is still valid to a degree.
Currently eleven NSCs are seen as replacing 12 WHECs, but we have yet to hear that 25 OPCs are not enough to replace 32 WMECs: 13 WMEC 270s, 16 WMEC210s, Alex Haley, Acushnet, and Storis. Maybe what we need is 33 OPCs, to make up for the shortfall in replacing both 12 WHECs and 32 WMECs, 44 ships to replace 44.
Thanks to Secundius for bringing this to my attention.
Drawing of future 10,000-ton cutter for China Maritime Safety Administration. (Picture source China Blog)
NavyRecognition is reporting that China is building an over 10,000 ton cutter for their Maritime Safety Administration (MSA). MSA is the only one of the five Chinese Maritime coast guard like organizations that was not incorporated into the China Coast Guard.
“According to information published by the Guangdong Maritime Safety Administration, the new cutter will have a total length of 165 meters, a width of 20.6 meters, a depth of 9.5 meters, and a displacement of 10,700 tons.”
That is 541 feet in length, 67.6 feet of beam, and 31.2 feet of draft. The displacement is probably light displacement rather than full load.
The China MSA appears less militant than the China Coast Guard. No weapons are evident, but that does not mean they don’t have a plan of how to use the ship in wartime. Like some of the large China Coast Guard cutters, this looks like it could be used as an attack transport.
“…on April 28, 2020, the first 600-ton catamaran-hull patrol vessel, Anping (CG601) for the Taiwanese Coast Guard was launched in the southern port city of Kaohsiung.”
This is the first of twelve ordered for the Taiwanese Coast Guard. The design is based on the Tuo Chiang-class stealth missile corvette in service with the Republic of China Navy.
An earlier post, from 2014, talked about these cutters and included a video of the Navy version of the design underway.
I am a bit surprised this program is not moving more rapidly. According to Wikipedia, work did not begin on these cutters until 2019. It appears the Taiwanese Navy still only has one of the 12 Corvettes planned. They may have had some problems.
Model of Tuo Chiang-class corvette armed with 76mm gun, Palanx CIWS, 8 × Hsiung Feng II and 8 × Hsiung Feng III, and 2 × Mark 32 triple torpedo launchers . Photo credit: Solomon203
What I found new, was information about SOUTHCOM interceptions,
In congressional testimony last year, Admiral Craig Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, noted: “The Coast Guard’s presence any given day is six to eight cutters. . . . But, keep in mind, we’re talking about covering areas the size of the United States—with from six to 10 ships. And so, the interdiction percentage with the current assets we have is about 6 percent of the detections. So, we need more ships.”
that is a lower interception rate than previously reported, and impact on jobs,
The NSC is an indispensable national asset. The economic impact of the NSC production line touches nearly 500 suppliers across 39 states. An additional ship order would help jumpstart the U.S. economy and have an immediate and profound effect on a host of U.S. suppliers, who stand ready to deliver. Moving forward with a 12th NSC is low risk.
If we had been further along with the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), I would say, just build another OPC instead of a twelth NSC, but we were way behind in starting the OPC program and the difficulties at Eastern put us even further behind.
The OPC program is so far behind, that the Bertholf is likely to be 30 years old before the 25th OPC is ready for its first operational mission. Plus we really do need more than 36 large patrol cutters, but the fact we have not done a new Fleet Mix Study in almost ten years does not help our case.
